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ABSTENTIONS IN THE GERMAN BUNDESRAT
AND TERNARY DECISION RULES
Andreas Kaufl, Friedrich Pukelsheim and Olga Ruff
Institute for Mathematics, University of Augsburg, Germany
Ternary decision rules are analyzed that allow for abstentions, in addition to Yea- and Nay-votes.
The German Bundesrat serves as a prime example. We show that the decision-making eciency
of the Bundesrat would increase if abstentions were allowed. Generally, a formula for the mean
success margin of a ternary decision rule is derived assuming selfdual and permutationally
invariant distributions. Specically, the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model is discussed in detail.
The inuence probabilities of voters, and the inuence sensitivity of the rule are evaluated.
1. Introduction. Many studies on decision rules concern settings where voters are faced
with just two options, to vote either Yea or Nay. In practical situations voters often have
the third option of abstaining. An interesting example is provided by the German Bun-
desrat, the second chamber representing the sixteen German States. The Bundesrat Rules
and Regulations do not provide for abstentions, yet States do abstain. Section 2 describes
the specic Bundesrat procedure in greater detail. The remaining sections develop a prob-
abilistic analysis of ternary decision rules.
A peculiar practice is exercised by the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
Abstentions are mostly counted as Nay-votes. But they are taken to be Yea-votes when
the adoption of a proposal requires unanimity, see Felsenthal/Machover (1998, page 335),
Lindner (2004, page 23). There is a historical precursor for such exibility. The 1802 Swiss
Notablenverfassung (Constitution of the Notables) drew more Nay-votes than Yea-votes
from the people. By classifying abstentions as Yeas, the Notables manufactured a majority
and the constitution entered into force (Reinhardt 2006, page 89).
There are decision-making systems that appreciate the particular quality of absten-
tions. For instance, the notion of a straight majority may be realized in two ways. The
rst way requires more than half of the plenum to vote Yea. This implies that those who
do not vote Yea are counted as opposers, whether they vote Nay or abstain. The second
way requires more Yea-votes than Nay-votes. Voters who abstain are acknowledged to be
undecided, and they drop out from comparing Yea- and Nay-votes.
While much of the literature on decision rules focuses on the binary case of Yea-Nay
voting, the analysis of ternary decision rules has now and then received some attention,
see the review in Section 10.1 of Felsenthal/Machover (2005). The earliest setting, such
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as Rubinstein (1980, 2002) and Bolger (1983), is the consideration of more than two
candidates for which the voters can opt, that is, there is a (unordered) multitude of levels
how voters can express their choice.
The other setting investigates an ordered set of ways how voters may express their
choice, such as three levels of increasing consent ranging from Nay over abstention to Yea.
This the predominant view in Felsenthal/Machover (1997, 1998), Braham/Steen (2002),
Freixas/Zwicker (2003, 2009), Co^rte-Real/Pereira (2004), Lindner (2004). In particular,
Freixas/Zwicker (2003) propose a systematic discussion how abstentions may be worked
into the more classical binary decision rule theory. In their terminology, the present paper
would be categorized as dealing with a (3; 2) voting game with ordered input alternatives,
that is, voters have 3 ordered input levels to express themselves (Nay, abstention, Yea)
and the resulting decision may attain 2 possible output levels (positive, negative).
The papers mentioned have a certain emphasis on the game-analytic properties of
multi-level decision rules, and their combinatorial structure. In the present paper we prefer
a more probabilistically oriented viewpoint. The companion paper Ru/Pukelsheim (2010)
presents a probabilistic synopsis of binary decision rules, the present paper extends this
approach to ternary decision rules.
Our basic assumption says that all participants share a common probability t of ab-
staining. For an a priori analysis we nd this supposition to be quite reasonable. The-
oretically, the abstention probability t is taken to range from zero to unity. Practically,
an abstention probability exceeding one third would seem to be of little practical value.
Felsenthal/Machover (1997, 1998) examine the case for t = 1=3, that is, equal probabil-
ities of voting Yea, Nay, or of abstaining. In the terminology of Freixas/Zwicker (2003),
the type of weighted voting games that we use is ratio-weighted voting, as opposed to
dierence-weighted voting. Our motivation was to stay close to the practical needs of the
current Bundesrat discussion. As it turns out the notions chosen also submit themselves
to a somewhat rigorous probabilistic analysis.
A brief overview of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a case study of some
current interest, the German Bundesrat. Section 3 introduces our reference space, the set
of ternary voting proles, within which we can conveniently dene the events of interest.
Section 4 adds the probabilistic assumptions, with an emphasis on distributions that are
selfdual and permutationally invariant. Section 5 applies the general theory to a specic
model, the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model. Section 6 adds a brief outlook toward other
modeling assumptions, and concludes with some nal remarks.
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2. Abstentions in the German Bundesrat. The Bundesrat (Federal Council) is one
of the ve constitutional organs of Germany, besides the Bundestag (Federal Diet, Par-
liament), Bundesregierung (Federal Government), Bundesprasident (Federal President)
and Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court). The Bundesrat, the second
chamber, is the assembly of the sixteen States of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Every State is allocated a certain number of Bundesrat seats. Delegation sizes only
vaguely mirror population sizes, yet this has never been a point of concern. Four States
send 6 delegates (Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia),
one State 5 (Hesse), seven States 4 (Berlin, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony,
Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia), four States 3 (Bremen, Hamburg, Meck-
lenburg-Western Pomerania, Saarland). Thus the Bundesrat plenum counts 69 members.
A State's delegation must submit their votes en bloc. In practice the head of delega-
tion, usually the State's Prime Minister, carries the corresponding voting weight. Factually,
then, four States command a voting weight of 6 units, one State voting weight 5, seven
States voting weight 4, and four States voting weight 3.
The Bundesrat uses two quotas. Normally, decisions call for a straight majority of
more than half of the votes, whence the one-half quota equals 35. Others, like constitutional
amendments, must reach at least a two-thirds quota, that is, 46 votes.
German State Governments are mostly coalition governments, with many of them
composed by political parties other than those that constitute the Federal Government.
Since quite a few proposals originate from the Federal Government and its administration,
it occasionally happens that the coalition partners in a State cannot agree on a common
vote. But their Bundesrat delegation must submit a bloc vote. So the consensus is to
abstain, often laid down in the coalition manifesto for the legislative period. In this way
the coalition governments on the state level shield themselves from being forced into a
political ght that is triggered on the federal level and that is not under the State's control.
However, the Bundesrat Rules and Regulations do not provide for abstentions. Only
Yea-votes count toward reaching the quotas of 35 or 46. Thus the political practice is a
bit peculiar. While the minutes do record whether a State abstains, the presidency only
counts Yea-votes and does not distinguish between Nay-votes and abstentions.
With an increasing diversication of the political spectrum it nowadays happens more
often then in former times that on the state level governments are formed by dierent
political coalitions than on the federal level. This increases the tensions on the decision-
making process in the Bundesrat in that it becomes increasingly harder to satisfy quota.
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For this reason Wolfgang Schauble, Minister for Interior Aairs during the legislative
period 2005{2009, proposed an amendment of the Bundesrat Rules and Regulations. In-
stead of referring the one-half and two-thirds quotas to the total number of votes (69), he
proposed to refer them to the total number of Yea- and Nay-votes and thus to give absten-
tions a novel, neutralizing eect. Schauble's intention was to strengthen the Bundesrat's
decision-making eciency, and to overcome its increasingly frequent stalemates.
The present paper quanties the eects of abstentions in the Bundesrat procedures. As
a measure for its decision-making capability we calculate the eciencies of the Bundesrat
decision rules. We also investigate how abstentions aect the inuence probabilities and
the power shares of the States, though this issue was not addressed in Schauble's proposal.
We adopt the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model. Voters abstain with probability t, while
they vote Yea or Nay with half of the remaining probability, (1  t)=2. The minutes of the
Bundesrat conrm that States vote more often Yea or Nay than abstain. Unfortunately we
did not succeed to acquire sucient empirical data from the Bundesrat archives in order
to dierentiate between the voting behavior of the various States. Of course, it is a bold
hypothesis assuming the same abstention probability for all States. On the other hand,
from an a priori point of view, common abstention probabilities appear to be a natural
starting point for a rst study. We focus on abstention probabilities between 0 and 1=3.
We evaluate the indices of interest by treating abstentions either as pseudo abstentions,
or as true abstentions:
 Pseudo abstentions: Abstentions are counted as Nay-votes. The percentage quota is
evaluated statically, relative to the sum of the weights of all votes (69).
 True abstentions: Abstentions are recorded as a category of their own, besides Yea-
and Nay-votes. The one-half and two-thirds quotas are evaluated dynamically, relative
to the sum of the weights of Yea- and Nay-votes.
The results of our ternary analysis are summarized in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 exhibits the behavior of the decision-making eciency of the decision rules
when the abstention probability t increases from 0 to 1=3. The eciency index tells how
likely a random voting prole turns out to be positive and leads to the acceptance of the
proposal. The top lines relate to a quota of one-half, the bottom lines of two-thirds.
The left panel reects current conditions, pseudo abstentions. The decision-making
eciency of the Bundesrat is seen to decrease, very much so in the case of the one-half
quota, and just a little bit for the two-thirds quota.
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Figure 1. Decision-making eciencies in the Bundesrat. Under current pseudo abstentions, eciencies
diminish when the abstention probability grows larger (left panel). Under hypothetical true abstentions,
eciencies are unaected for the one-half quota, and slightly increase for the two-thirds quota (right panel).
The right panel displays the behavior in the case of true abstentions. True absten-
tions have almost no eect on the one-half quota and leave the decision-making eciency
virtually constant. In the case of the two-thirds quota the eciencies are even slightly
increasing. Figure 1 conrms the intuitive judgment of Wolfgang Schauble that by ac-
knowledging true abstentions the Bundesrat would operate more eciently.
Figure 2 corroborates Schauble's view as far as the inuence probabilities and the
power shares of the States are concerned. The panels show how the inuence probabilities
of the States change, as the abstention probability grows from 0 to 1=3. The four lines
refer to the States with voting weights 6, 5, 4, 3, from top to bottom.
The upper panels apply to the one-half quota. Panel A, for pseudo abstentions, has
all inuence probabilities decreasing. Panel B treats true abstentions, and has all inuence
probabilities slightly increasing.
The lower panels are for the two-thirds quota. Panel C shows pseudo abstentions.
The decrease of the inuence probabilities is more pronounced, and falls almost down to
zero. Panel D refers to true abstentions. The inuence probabilities increase more than in
Panel B.
Yet another index is provided by the power shares of the States, the quotients of the
inuence probability of a single State over the inuence sensitivity of the decision rule. We
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Figure 2. Inuence probabilities of the States. Panels A and B apply to the one-half quota. The inu-
ence probabilities of all States decrease under current pseudo abstentions (A), and mildly increase under
hypothetical true abstentions (B). The eect stands out more clearly for the two-thirds quota (C and D).
nd that all States acquire power shares that stay practically constant on the same level.
In other words, no State gains or loses power relative to another State when switching
from pseudo abstentions to true abstentions. The graphical message inherent in constant
lines is rather uninformative, and hence omitted.
It is open to debate which conclusions to draw from the results shown. For instance,
true abstentions and the two-thirds quota entail decision-making eciencies that grow with
the abstention probability, see Figure 1, right panel, lower line. Thus a higher abstention
probability makes it increasingly easier to pass a constitutional amendment. This may
not be a reasonable political goal. Instead one might contemplate to maintain the status
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quo of pseudo abstentions for the two-thirds quota, and to introduce true abstentions only
when the normal business one-half quota is used.
In any case the example illustrates how the discussion of characteristic indices of
decision rules may contribute to a design of sound procedures. The remaining sections
turn to a general theory for the ternary setting.
3. Ternary voting proles and decision rules. Let N be a nite set, the assembly,
of n voters. A voting prole is a vector a = (aj)j2N with ternary components, aj := 1 in
case voter j 2 N is a Yea-voter, aj :=  1 in case j is a Nay-voter, and aj := 0 in case
voter j abstains. Together the voting proles form the ternary prole space

N := f 1; 0; 1gN :
Let 1N := (1; : : : ; 1) denote the unity vector with n components, signifying the prole
with everybody voting Yea. For a given voting prole a 2 
N the component-wise partial
ordering  of vectors induces the interval region of increasing consent, [a; 1N ] := fb 2 
N :
a  b  1Ng. A ternary decision rule is a subset WN  
N enjoying three properties:
(1) [a; 1N ] WN for all a 2WN ;
(2) 1N 2WN ;
(3) 0 62WN :
The monotonicity property (1) is central: If a voting prole a is in WN and b exhibits
at least as much consent as a, b  a, then b is also in WN . In view of (1), property (2)
means that the decision rule WN is nonempty. Property (3) implies that proles without
a single Yea-voter are necessarily losing. The voting proles in WN are termed positive
or winning, for the reason that they are taken to represent the positive outcomes of the
voting procedure. They are also known as winning coalitions, or winning congurations.
The voting proles in the complement W cN := 
N nWN are called negative or losing.
Instead of our property (3) Felsenthal/Machover (1998, page 283) demand
(30)   1N 62WN :
Under (30) a voting prole consisting of abstentions only and even including Nay-votes
could still come out to be positive. We believe that such generosity is impractical and,
therefore, adopt our more restrictive property (3).
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A family of decision rules that is of particular relevance is formed by weighted decision
rules. Let w = (wj)j2N 2 (0;1)N be a vector of voting weights. The sum of all components
of w is denoted by w+ :=
P
j2N wj . For a given voting prole a the sum of the voting
weights of its Yea-voters is
P
j:aj=1
wj , and denes the prole weight of a.
The denition of weighted decision rules is more involved for ternary decision rules
than for binary decision rules. The underlying idea is the same: the prole weight should
exceed a certain prespecied quota. For the ternary case, however, the reference set for
the quota is variable. For this reason we prefer to work with relative quotas q 2 [0; 1). The
relative quota q is evaluated relative to the sum of the weights of the voters who vote Yea
or Nay, excluding the weights of the voters who abstain.
To this end we dene the indicator vector of the voters who vote either Yea or Nay,
jaj := (jaj j)j2N . The indicator vectors that characterize the Yea-voters, the Nay-voters,
and the voters who abstain then take the form
(jaj+ a)=2; (jaj   a)=2; 1N   jaj:
Again we use a subscript \+" to indicate the sum of all components. The number of
Yea-voters is given by (jaj+ + a+)=2, the number of Nay-voters is (jaj+   a+)=2, and the
number of those who abstain is n  jaj+. In a prole a the cumulative weight of the Yea-
and Nay-voters is given by the scalar product of the indicator vector jaj and the weight
vector w, w0jaj :=Pj:jaj j=1 wj .
We are now in a position to formally introduce the weighted decision rule WN (q;w).
By denition, it contains the voting proles for which the prole weight exceeds the share q
of the cumulative weight of the Yea- and Nay-voters,
WN (q;w) :=
n
a 2 
N :
X
j:aj=1
wj > q w
0jaj
o
:
In particular, voters who abstain drop out from calculating the absolute quota Q(a) :=
q w0jaj. The denition demands strict inequality in order to satisfy property (3), that the
voting prole with everybody abstaining cannot be winning. Freixas/Zwicker (2009, page
430) point out, though, that the two-thirds quota is often taken to mean \two-thirds or
more" rather than \strictly more than two-thirds", as is the case in the German Bundesrat.
Important examples for weighted ternary decision rules are the unanimity rule UN
and the straight majority rule MN :
UN :=WN (1  1=n; 1N ) = fa 2 
N : a+ = jaj+ > 0g;
MN :=WN (1=2; 1N ) = fa 2 
N : a+ > 0g:
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An event of some interest is composed by the voting proles where participant j 2 N is
critical. Given a voting prole a, a voter j is upgrade-critical when the prole a is negative,
but an increase in the degree of consent of j turns it positive (by voter j switching from
Nay to abstention, or from Nay to Yea, or from abstention to Yea). Similarly voter j is
called downgrade-critical in a when the prole a starts out to be positive, but becomes
negative as soon as the approval level of j decreases (from Yea to abstention, or from Yea
to Nay, or from abstention to Nay). A voter j is critical or decisive when j is upgrade- or
downgrade-critical.
For a concise denition of critical events we introduce Nnfjg, the projection of the
prole space 
N = f 1; 0; 1gN onto 
Nnfjg = f 1; 0; 1gNnfjg, the (n   1)-dimensional
marginal space omitting voter j. Given a marginal voting prole b 2 
Nnfjg without
voter j, we introduce the full voting proles (b; 1) with j joining by voting Yea, (b; 0)
with j abstaining, and (b; 1) with j voting Nay. The set of voting proles where voter j
is critical takes the form
Cj(WN ) :=
n
a 2 
N :
 
Nnfjg(a); 1
 2WN and  Nnfjg(a); 1 2W cNo:
Let Dj(WN ) := Nnfjg
 
Cj(WN )

denote the image under the projection Nnfjg of the
critical event Cj(WN ).
Theorem 1. Let WN be a ternary decision rule for an assembly N . Then Cj(WN )
is the pre-image of Dj(WN ) under the projection Nnfjg :
Cj(WN ) = 
 1
Nnfjg
 
Dj(WN )

:
Proof. A vector a 2 
N is mapped to the image b := Nnfjg(a) 2 
Nnfjg, with
components bi = ai for all i 6= j. The vector b 2 
Nnfjg has three pre-images, (b; 1),
(b; 0) and (b; 1). Hence we obtain Dj(WN ) =

b 2 
Nnfjg : (b; 1) 2 W cN ; (b; 1) 2 WN
	
.
Evidently the pre-image of Dj(WN ) reproduces the event Cj(WN ).
Next we turn to evaluating the events of interest by means of appropriate probability
distributions.
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4. Ternary probability models. Let P be a probability distribution on the ternary
prole space 
N , and let WN be a ternary decision rule. The share of all positive voting
proles P (WN ) is called the eciency of WN under P . It serves as an indicator for the
decision-making ability of the decision rule WN under P .
The inuence probability of voter j in the decision rule WN is dened to be the
probability of j being critical, P
 
Cj(WN )

. The sum of all inuence probabilities is termed
the decision rule's inuence sensitivity, P (WN ) :=
P
j2N P
 
Cj(WN )

.
The critical events Cj(WN ), j 2 N , generally neither cover the prole space 
N , nor
are they pairwise disjoint. Hence there is no reason for the inuence sensitivity to be
equal to unity. However, the inuence sensitivity can be used to normalize the inuence
probability of j into P
 
Cj(WN )

=P (WN ), the power share of voter j under P . The power
shares form a probability distribution on the set of voters, N , preserving for any two voters
i 6= j the ratio of their inuence probabilities, P  Ci(WN )=P  Cj(WN ). We shall not shift
references spaces, though, and stick to the prole space 
N .
In summary, eciency and inuence sensitivity are indices that refer to the decision
rule WN as a whole, while inuence probabilities and power shares describe characteristics
of individual voters j 2 N .
Two structural properties become essential for singling out particularly meaningful
probability assumptions. A distribution P is called selfdual when P (fag) = P (f ag)
holds for all voting proles a 2 
N . Selfduality means that the probability of a prole a
occurring for some proposal, equals the probability that the dual voting prole  a emerges
for the negated proposal.
A distribution P is called permutationally invariant when P   1 = P holds for all
permutations  of the assembly N . That is, it does not matter whether a prole a lists
voters in one way or another. To see the eect of permutational invariance, we write the
prole space 
N as the disjoint union of the sets of voting proles with xed numbers k
of Yea-voters and ` of Nay-voters (and hence n  k   ` abstentions):

N =
n]
k=0
n k]
`=0

N
k; `

;

N
k; `

:=
n
a 2 
N : (jaj+ + a+)=2 = k and (jaj+   a+)=2 = `
o
:
The cardinality of the latter set is given by the trinomial coecient
n
k; `

:=

n
k

n  k
`

=
n!
k!`!(n  k   `)! :
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Within such a prole subset, a permutationally invariant distribution behaves like a uni-
form distribution:
P (fag) = 1
n
k; `
P  N
k; `

for all a 2

N
k; `

:
A voting prole a 2 
N is said to be a success for voter j, and voter j is said to agree
with the prole a, provided the prole is positive and j votes Yea (a 2 WN ; aj = 1), or
the prole is negative and j votes Nay (a 2 W cN ; aj =  1). A positive voting prole is
taken to be a failure for a Nay-voter, as is a negative voting prole for a Yea-voter. An
abstaining voter j is taken to be indierent, whence the prole counts neither as a success
nor as a failure.
The dierence between the number of voters for which a voting prole is a success,
and the number of the voters for which it is a failure, denes the success margin WN (a)
of the voting prole a:
WN (a) :=

a+ in case a 2WN ,
 a+ in case a 2W cN .
Some emphasis is laid on the positive voting proles a 2 WN that are a failure to a
majority of the voters. For such voting proles the success margin is negative. Hence the
negative part of the success margin is called the majority decit, WN (a) := 
 
WN
(a) = jWN (a)j   WN (a)=2.
Theorem 2. Let WN be a ternary decision rule for an assembly N .
(i) The success margin WN and the majority decit WN satisfy WN = MN  
2WN  MN , where MN is the success margin of the straight majority rule MN . In
particular, every distribution P fullls
EP [WN ]  EP [MN ]:
(ii) Every selfdual distribution P fullls
EP [WN ] = 2
X
a2WN
a+P (fag) = 2
nX
k=1
n kX
`=0
(k   `)P

WN \

N
k; `

:
(iii) Every selfdual and permutationally invariant distribution P fullls
EP [WN ]  EP [UN ]:
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Proof. (i) The absolute value of any success margin is equal to the success margin
of the straight majority rule, since jWN (a)j = ja+j = MN (a). The assertions follow from
WN = (MN   WN )=2, and WN  jWN j = MN .
(ii) With the indicator function 1fa 2WNg = 1 in case a 2WN and 1fa 2WNg = 0
in case a 2 W cN , the success margin becomes WN (a) = (2  1fa 2 WNg   1)a+. We
obtain EP [WN ] = 2
P
a2WN a+P (fag) 
P
a2
N a+P (fag). The last sum vanishes due to
a+ =  ( a+) and the selfduality of P :
2
X
a2
N
a+P (fag) =
X
a2
N
a+P (fag) 
X
a2
N
( a)+P (f ag) = 0:
In view of a+ = k   ` the second equality is a rearrangement according to the number
of Yea-voters, k = (jaj+ + a+)=2, and the number of Nay-voters, ` = (jaj+   a+)=2. In
the rst sum k ranges from 1 to n since 0 62 WN and hence
n
N
0;`
o
62 WN , due to the
monotonicity condition (1).
(iii) Since for every voting prole a 2
n
N
k;`
o
its dual voting prole  a is in
n
N
`;k
o
,
selfdual distributions satisfy P
n
N
k;`
o
= P
n
N
`;k
o
. Permutational invariance yields
P (fag) = P (fbg) = 1
n
k; `
P  N
k; `

for all a 2
n N
k; `
o
and b 2
n N
`; k
o
:
For the unanimity rule UN =
Un
k=1
n
N
k;0
o
part (ii) entails
EP [WN ] = EP [UN ] + 2
nX
k=1
n kX
`=1
(k   `)P

WN \

N
k; `

:
We show that the double sum is nonnegative. Note that the summand vanishes in case
` = k. Omitting this case and applying permutational invariance and selfduality, we obtain
nX
k=1
k 1X
`=1
(k   `)P

WN \

N
k; `

+
nX
k=1
n kX
`=k+1
(k   `)P

WN \

N
k; `

=
nX
k=2
k 1X
`=1
(k   `)
 
P

WN \

N
k; `

  P

WN \

N
`; k
!
=
nX
k=2
k 1X
`=1
(k   `)
n
k; `
 #WN \ N
k; `

 #

WN \

N
`; k
!
:
Since a decision rule WN is monotone, by its dening property (1), any set of positive
voting proles with many Yea-voters (k) outnumbers any set of positive voting proles
with fewer Yea-voters (l). Hence the nal expression is nonnegative.
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5. The ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model. The ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model as-
sumes that all voters act independently and that the individual marginal distributions are
Multinominal
 
(1  t)=2; t; (1  t)=2. Thus voters are taken to share a common abstention
probability t 2 [0; 1), and to vote Yea or Nay with half of the remaining probability, (1 t)=2.
Hence the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf distribution P tN , contingent upon the \ternary" pa-
rameter t, is dened through
P tN (fag) := tn jaj+

1  t
2
jaj+
for all a 2 
N :
It is easy to see that these distributions are selfdual and permutationally invariant. They
are also projectively consistent in the sense that the identity P tN   1Nnfjg = P tNnfjg holds
for all j 2 N .
Theorem 3 looks at the sets of voting proles that are a success for voter j (that is,
where j \agrees" with the outcome), or a failure:
Aj(WN ) := fa 2 
N : a 2WN and aj = 1; or a 2W cN and aj =  1g ;
Fj(WN ) := fa 2 
N : a 2WN and aj =  1; or a 2W cN and aj = 1g :
We call P tN
 
Aj(WN )

the success probability and P tN
 
Fj(WN )

the failure probability of
voter j. They are related to the inuence probability of j, as follows.
Theorem 3. Let WN be a ternary decision rule for an assembly N . The ternary
Penrose/Banzhaf success, failure, and inuence probabilities for voter j 2 N fulll
P tN

Aj(WN )

=
1  t
2
+
1  t
2
P tN

Cj(WN )

;
P tN

Fj(WN )

=
1  t
2
  1  t
2
P tN

Cj(WN )

:
Proof. Voting proles in which voter j abstains are neither a success nor a failure.
In the complementary proles j votes Yea or Nay, faj = 1g := fa 2 
N : aj 6= 0g.
Clearly we have Aj(WN ) = Aj(WN ) \ faj = 1g.
Every voting prole in which voter j's Yea or Nay is critical is a success for j. This
rst case occurs with probability
P tN
 
Cj(WN ) \ faj = 1g

= P tfjg(f1g)P tNnfjg
 
Dj(WN )

= (1  t)P tN
 
Cj(WN )

:
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For a voting prole a in which voter j's Yea or Nay is not critical, either (b; 1) or (b; 1)
is a success for j, where the projection b = Nnfjg(a) comprises the votes of the others.
Since the two possibilities are equally likely, the contribution of the second case is
1
2
P tN
 
Cj(WN )
c \ faj = 1g

=
1  t
2

1  P tN
 
Cj(WN )

:
The sum of the two cases yields the success probability of j as given in the assertion.
The failure probability formula follows from the identity P tN
 
Aj(WN )

+ P tN
 
Fj(WN )

=
P tN
 faj = 1g = 1  t.
We are now in a position to show that the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf inuence sensi-
tivity coincides with the Penrose/Banzhaf mean success margin, up to a scaling constant
that solely depends on the abstention probability t.
Theorem 4. LetWN be a ternary decision rule for an assembly N . Under the ternary
Penrose/Banzhaf distribution with abstention probability t 2 [0; 1), the inuence sensitivity
of WN and the mean success margin of WN fulll
P t
N
(WN ) =
1
1  tEP tN [WN ]:
Proof. For every voter j we dene the success function
j(a) :=
8><>:
1 in case a 2 Aj(WN ),
0 in case aj = 0,
 1 in case a 2 Fj(WN ).
The success margin is the sum of the individual success functions, WN (a) =
P
j2N j(a).
From Theorem 3 we obtain
EP t
N
[WN ] =
X
j2N

P tN
 
Aj(WN )
  P tN Fj(WN ) = (1  t)P tN (WN ):
Theorems 2 and 4 provide bounds for the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf inuence sensi-
tivity P t
N
(WN ) of an arbitrary ternary decision rule WN . The lower bound is given by
the unanimity rule, through P t
N
(UN ) = n
 
1+t
2
n 1
. The upper bound stems from the
straight majority rule,
P t
N
(MN ) =
nX
k=1
k 1X
`=0
(k   `)

n
k; `

tn k `

1  t
2
k+` 1
:
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6. Discussion. The present paper proposes a probabilistic approach to ternary decision
rules that permit committee members to vote Yea, or Nay, or to abstain. Our motivation
to calculate some characteristic indices for such rules originates from the political debate
in Germany to improve upon the decision procedures used in the Bundesrat, in order to
increase the Bundesrat's decision-making eciency.
Current Bundesrat procedures implement pseudo abstentions, as described in Sec-
tion 2, with an abstention factually being viewed as just another way of voting Nay. Such
a system is modeled by a distribution wherein voters act independently, and vote Yea with
probability (1   t)=2 and Nay with the complementary probability (1 + t)=2. Thus the
binary voting prole a 2 f 1; 1gN occurs with probability
1  t
2
(n+a+)=21 + t
2
(n a+)=2
:
The pseudo abstention curves in Figures 1 and 2 were calculated with these probabilities,
using generating functions as in Bilbao et al. (2000) and Leech (2002) for ecient compu-
tation. The example is interesting also from the theoretical viewpoint, in that it is based
on a probability distribution that fails to be selfdual but otherwise looks quite reasonable.
True abstentions generate ternary voting proles a 2 f 1; 0; 1gN , with the additional
code aj = 0 signaling an abstention of voter j. A pertinent probability model is obtained
by extending the binary Penrose/Banzhaf model to the ternary situation. The ternary
Penrose/Banzhaf distribution comes with a \ternary" parameter t, the probability with
which voters abstain. The model assumes the abstention probability t to be the same for
all voters, and hence assigns to the ternary voting prole a 2 f 1; 0; 1gN the probability
tn jaj+

1  t
2
jaj+
:
The true abstention curves in Figures 1 and 2 were calculated under the ternary Penrose/
Banzhaf model.
Our Theorems 3 and 4 reproduce the results of Felsenthal/Machover (1998, Section
8.3) for the special case t = 1=3, that is, when a Yea, a Nay, and an abstention are equally
likely. We believe that 1=3 gets close to the maximum of an abstention probability to be
met in practice. For this reason the curves in Figures 1 and 2 do not extend beyond 1=3.
The ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model includes a vanishing abstention probability, t = 0.
In this case, ternary decision rules degenerate to binary decision rules. Accordingly,
the present formulas simplify to those familiar from binary decision rules, see Felsen-
thal/Machover (1998, Section 3.2) and Ru/Pukelsheim (2010).
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There is a more sophisticated way to extract binary decision rules from the ternary
case, by viewing the binary prole space f 1; 1gN as a subset of the ternary prole space
f 1; 0; 1gN . Indeed, every ternary decision rule WN  f 1; 0; 1gN has a binary trace
B(WN ) :=WN \f 1; 1gN that turns out to be a well-dened binary decision rule, in that
it fullls properties (1), (2), and (30) of Section 3.
Furthermore, a probability distribution P on the ternary prole space induces a dis-
tribution on the binary prole space through conditioning,
P

fag
f 1; 1gN = P (fag)
P (f 1; 1gN ) ;
for all binary voting proles a 2 f 1; 1gN . Not surprisingly, all ternary Penrose/Banzhaf
distributions induce the same binary trace, namely the well-known binary Penrose/Banzhaf
distribution.
In summary, our results on the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model aord a passage back
to the binary Penrose/Banzhaf model not only through the singular parameter choice
t = 0, but also, by conditioning, for all conceivable parameter values t 2 [0; 1).
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Moshe Machover and Bill Zwicker for crit-
ical comments on an earlier version of the present paper.
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